



TLS 1.3

Team Building 2018 / Brno

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Agenda & Takeaways

Agenda

- history
- high level view
- cryptography 101
- TLS handshake
- TLS 1.3
- books & resources

History

3 > 1

Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security

- SSL 1.0 – never released
- SSL 2.0 – 1995
- SSL 3.0 – 1996
- TLS 1.0 – 1999
- TLS 1.1 – 2006
- TLS 1.2 – 2008
- TLS 1.3 – ~~2014~~, ~~2015~~, ~~2016~~, ~~2017~~, 2018?

~~SSL~~
TLS

Attacks


- **Bleichenbacher (1998), ROBOT (2018), CCA2**
- **Renegotiation (2009)**
- **BEAST (2011), TLS 1.0 CBC IV**
- **POODLE (2014), padding oracle**
- **CRIME, TIME, BREACH (2012-13), compression**
- **Heartbleed (2014), OpenSSL**
- **FREAK, Logjam (2015), downgrade**
- **SLOTH, SWEET32 (2016), weak crypto**

RFC 7457 “Summarizing Known Attacks on TLS and DTLS”

Libraries

- **OpenSSL**
 - LibreSSL (OpenBSD, partly incompatible fork)
 - BoringSSL (Google, API incompatible fork)
- **NSS (Mozilla Firefox)**
- **SChannel (Microsoft)**
- **Secure Transport (Apple)**
- **more: GnuTLS, Java JSSE, Go crypto/tls, kTLS**

**10,000 foot
high level view**



“TLS”

=

”encryption”

Wikipedia definition

*Transport Layer Security (TLS) – and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) – are cryptographic protocols that provide **communications security** over a computer network. The TLS protocol aims primarily to provide **privacy** and **data integrity** between two communicating computer applications.*

TLS core features

- encrypted transport stream
- application protocol agnostic
- integrity check
- replay attack protection
- strong authentication of server
- strong authentication of client (optional)
- extensible protocol

TLS standard

- IETF standard (Internet engineering task force)
- IANA (Internet assigned number authority)
- TLS (TCP) / DTLS (UDP)
- ASN.1
- PKI with X.509 certificates

Crypto 101

Cryptographically secure hash functions


Hash functions for MAC, signatures, and more.


- MD5
- SHA (SHA1)
- SHA2
 - SHA-256
 - SHA-384

Symmetric-key algorithm (bulk encryption)


Same key for encryption and decryption.

- DES
- Triple DES (3DES)
- RC4
- AES (AES-128, AES-256)
- CHACHA20







All




modes




are




beautiful




not you



and



deserve



to be



used

Symmetric-key algorithm (2)




- Padding
- Mode of operation
 - CBC
 - GCM
- Authenticated encryption
 - CBC with MtE
 - AEAD (GCM, Poly1305)

Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms

public / private key cryptography

- asymmetric encryption
- signatures
- key agreement

PUBLIC KEY KRÜPTO



Asymmetric encryption

public key encrypts, private key decrypts

- ElGamal encryption
- RSA encryption (PKCS#1)
 - **RSAES-PKCS1-v1.5**
 - RSAES-OAEP

Asymmetric signatures

private key signs hash of message message, public key verifies

- RSA signature (PKCS#1)
 - **RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5**
 - RSAES-PSS
- **DSS (DSA)**
- ECDSA (secp256r1, secp384r1, ...)
- EdDSA (Edward Curve25519, ...)

Key agreement protocol

own private key + peer's public = key

- finite field Diffie-Hellman (DH)
- elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
- ephemeral DH / ECDH

Misc

- random numbers generator (CPRNG)
- HMAC
- Key Derivation Function (KDF)
- Key Wrapping (KW)
- ...

Cryptographic building blocks

- key agreement / exchange
- authentication algorithm
- bulk encryption (symmetric)
- cipher mode
- one-way function for message authentication (MAC)

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384


TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5

TLS handshake


TLS handshake with RSA key exchange



TLS handshake with RSA key exchange

- ✓ negotiate TLS version
- ✓ negotiate cipher suite
- ✓ validate server cert chain
- ✓ replay protection: MAC client/server random
- × **no forward secrecy**

TLS handshake with Diffie-Hellman



Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman

- ✓ negotiate TLS version
- ✓ negotiate cipher suite
- ✓ validate server cert chain
- ✓ replay protection: MAC client/server random
- ✓ perfect forward secrecy
- × **actually no PFS...**

TLS extensions & alerts


TLS alert

- close_notify
- handshake failure
 - no ciphers available
- unknown_ca
- decryption_failed
- ...

TLS extensions

- heart beat
- server name indication (virtual hosting)
- ALPN (HTTP/2)
- session resumption
- signature algorithms
- supported groups (ECDH curves)

TLS handshake with session resumption



Session resumption

- session ticket contains encrypted key
 - ticket encrypted with server's **Session Ticket Key**
 - STK is a shared key
- browsers usually request session resumption
 - server sends ticket in first request
- bad design
 - ticket is not TLS encrypted
 - **current master key!**

TLS 1.3

TLS 1.3 is a major change

Versions: ([draft-ietf-tls-rfc5246-bis](#)) [00](#) [01](#)
[02](#) [03](#) [04](#) [05](#) [06](#) [07](#) [08](#) [09](#) [10](#) [11](#) [12](#) [13](#)
[14](#) [15](#) [16](#) [17](#) [18](#) [19](#) [20](#) [21](#) [22](#) [23](#) [24](#)

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Obsoletes: [5077](#), [5246](#) (if approved)
Updates: [4492](#), [5705](#), [6066](#), [6961](#) (if
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: August 19, 2018

E. Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
February 15, 2018

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24

Abstract

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

Kill all the bad crypto!

- RC4, 3DES, AES-CBC
- MD5, SHA1
- NULL ciphers
- arbitrary DH groups and curves
- static RSA authentication
- renegotiation
- compression
- PKCS#1 v1.5
- MAC then Encrypt




New modern crypto

- **Elliptic Curve Crypto**
 - Edwards Curve (Ed25519)
 - Curve25519, X25519
- **authenticated encryption (AEAD)**
 - AES-GCM
 - CHACHA20-Poly1305
- **mandatory Diffie-Hellman → PFS**
 - no “out-of-band TLS decryption”
- **RSAES-PSS signatures**

Protocol improvements

- Cipher negotiation protected by *Finish* MAC (LogJam)
- Separation of key agreement, ciphers, authentication
- Cipher suites
 - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- TLS extensions
 - signature_algorithms, cert_signature_algorithms, elliptic_curves
- Session resumption with PSK-ECDHE
 - after *Finish*, TLS encrypted, next master key
- Encrypted Post-Handshake auth (client cert)


TLS 1.3 with 1-RTT handshake




Hacks

- Middlebox compatibility mode
 - Version: TLSv1.2
 - TLS ext: supported_version 0x304
- Downgrade protection in server random
 - = TLSv1.2 DOWNGRD\x00
 - < TLSv.1.2 DOWNGRD\x01
- HelloRetryRequest random
SHA256("HelloRetryRequest")

TLS 1.3 with 2-RTT retry handshake



TLS 1.3 with 0-RTT early data





0-RTT caveats

- Replay attack
- No forward secrecy

Applications must define a profile for early data

Resources

Books



Resources

- <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>
- <https://istlsfastyet.com/>
- **Deploying TLS 1.3: the great, the good and the bad (33c3)**
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0opakLwtPWk>



Let's Encrypt



FreeIPA

Open Source Identity Management Solution



THANK YOU



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